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We assess the welfare implications of alternative retirement plan investment options 
given that households may not invest according to optimal portfolio choice theory but 
may instead use simple decision rules. We simulate the performance of lifestyle, 
lifecycle, and other simple strategies for allocating retirement savings. We find that if 
investors use simple rules of thumb to choose investments, then the impact of these 
strategies on welfare depend to a large extent on the choice set they are offered. If larger 
choice sets cause them to undertake more risk, then risk tolerant individuals may tend to 
be made better off. If larger choice sets cause them to reduce suboptimally low levels of 
portfolio risk, then the increased choice set may make them substantially worse off. The 
welfare effects of plan designs that induce lifecycle investing, which tends to be 
conservative over the lifetime, therefore depend crucially on the counterfactual portfolio 
















Standard investment advice calls for individuals to reduce the allocation to risky assets
with age, or, more precisely, as the investment horizon shortens. Canner et al. (1997), for
example, cite a rule of thumb stock allocation percentage of 100 minus age. More generally,
so-called lifecycle funds decrease the share in equities as the investor ages. These funds have
become increasingly popular investment vehicles in the United States. In fact, President
Bush’s recent proposal to reform Social Security, entitled Strengthening Social Security in
the 21st Century, called for allocating the entire investment portfolio at age 47 to a lifecycle
fund, subject to an opt-out provision.
Yet, the increasing popularity of lifecycle funds and associated investment strategies runs
counter to a key ﬁnding by Samuelson (1969) that the portfolio allocation should be invariant
to the investment horizon. Samuelson (1994) discusses several exceptions to this result, as
do Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) and Ameriks and Zeldes (2004). For example, one
must account for human capital wealth when assessing the allocation of total wealth, in which
case age variation of the optimal ﬁnancial wealth allocation depends crucially on the variation
of labor market earnings with ﬁnancial market returns. The possibility for a labor supply
response to ﬁnancial market realizations as a form of hedging oﬀers a clearer justiﬁcation for
a lifecycle investment strategy (Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson, 1992). Standard investment
advice, however, tends to ignore these aspects of prospective labor market earnings, focusing
instead on risk tolerance, investment horizon, and, perhaps, the extent of background risks,
1such as labor income risk.
In their review of theoretical justiﬁcations for lifecycle investment strategies, Ameriks
and Zeldes (2004) note the possibility that risk preferences vary systematically with age. If
investors become more risk averse with age, then the optimal portfolio allocation will become
more conservative as the investor ages. A similar argument holds for their expectations. That
is, if expectations of returns to risky assets become lower with age, as has been found by
Dominitz and Manski (2004, 2006), then the optimal portfolio allocation of a risk averse
investor will become more conservative as the investor ages. Dominitz and Manski also ﬁnd
that expectations tend to follow lagged stock market outcomes. If households make portfolio
choices based on such beliefs, then we would expect to ﬁnd that they “chase returns,” which
would lead to particularly bad outcomes in a world with negative serial correlation of returns.
Recent work in behavioral ﬁnance suggests that, whatever their preferences, expectations,
and background risks, investors do not make optimal portfolio allocation decisions. Instead,
they tend to use heuristics or simple decision rules to make their initial allocation decisions.
Madrian and Shea (2001) examine 401(k) allocation behavior by a group of employees from
a Fortune 500 company and ﬁnd that an individual’s allocation of regular contributions to
a 401(k) plan is sensitive to enrollment default options. One group of employees in their
analysis are automatically enrolled in the 401(k) plan unless they explicitly choose to opt
out. For these employees, the default investment for the 401(k) plan is a money market
fund. The authors ﬁnd that over 90% of these employees hold the money market fund in
2their 401(k) balance, and 75% of these employees hold their entire 401(k) balance in the
money market fund. In contrast, of employees from this same company for whom there is
no default fund allocation, less than 20% hold any money market fund in the their 401(k)
balance.
A related example of apparently suboptimal decision making is the preponderance of the
“1
n rule” documented by Benartzi and Thaler (2001). These authors ﬁnd that investor allo-
cation decisions are heavily dependent upon the choices oﬀered to them. Roughly speaking,
if they are oﬀered n choices, then they tend to allocate 1
n of their investment to each of
the choices oﬀered, independently of the risk characteristics of the investment opportunities.
This decision rule implies that participants in a plan that oﬀers numerous equity funds and
few bond funds will end up allocating most of their savings to equity funds, regardless of
individual risk preferences and investment horizons.
By analyzing ﬁnancial records provided by Vanguard for over 570,000 participants in 639
deﬁned contribution plans, Huberman and Jiang (2006) ﬁnd that investors follow the 1
n rule,
but the "n" used in the denominator is not the number of fund choices available. Instead,
they ﬁnd that most investors equally allocate their 401(k) contributions across a subset of
funds. This subset is typically composed of less than four funds, and the number of chosen
funds is independent of the size of the choice menu. Furthermore, in contrast to Benartzi
and Thaler’s ﬁnding, Huberman and Jiang ﬁnd only a marginal relation between participant
equity allocation and the proportion of equity funds oﬀered in their 401(k) plan.
3In contrast, Iyengar and Jiang (2005) ﬁnd that in the presence of additional choices,
investors choose less risky options. The implication of their ﬁnding is that participants in
ap l a nt h a to ﬀers numerous equity funds and few bond funds will allocate more savings to
bond funds than if there were fewer equity funds oﬀered.
Retirement portfolios are rarely adjusted. The overwhelming majority of individuals
engage in no rebalancing of 401(k) portfolios in any year (Hewitt Associates, 2004; Investment
Company Institute, 2001; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Even where the introduction of
Internet access was found to greatly increase trading activity, most participants were inactive
over a three-year period of study that immediately preceded the stock market collapse of
2000 (Choi et al, 2002). One may attribute the lack of portfolio rebalancing to a deliberate
buy-and-hold strategy. Yet such a strategy may be suboptimal when equities exhibit wide
swings in value over time, such as during the past decade. A very diﬀerent conclusion about
transactions was reached by Odean (1999), who asked whether investors trade too much. His
sample, however, consisted of individuals who had brokerage accounts, whose active behavior
in these accounts seems to diﬀer greatly from the inactivity observed in retirement accounts.
Our goal here is to assess the welfare implications of alternative retirement plan invest-
ment options given that households may not invest according to optimal portfolio choice
theory but may instead use simple decision rules. It is these decision rules that have led to
calls for the use of lifecycle funds as the default investment choice. But would investment in
a single lifecycle fund be better for all such households, who have heterogeneous preferences
4and wealth? If so, then, in the context of a personal retirement account component of Social
Security, why not just have an independent agency invest the funds for everyone, perhaps
with an opt-out provision along the lines proposed by President Bush for age-47 and above?
We address such questions by performing numerous simulations based on the historical
distribution of returns to common stock, long-term government bonds, and Treasury bills,
as used by Canner et al. (1997). We also add simulated funds designed to mimic the choice
set facing participants in the federal government employee Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), one
of which is a lifecycle fund. Finally, we add three so-called lifestyle funds. The ﬁnal report
of the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001) recommended oﬀering
three such balanced funds—“conservative, medium, and growth.” We implement these funds
as mixes of the other funds. Our lifecycle fund is also a mix of the other funds, with the
fraction in risky assets declining linearly as retirement approaches.
The approach we take to addressing these questions is similar in spirit to Calvet et
al. (2006). They assess the welfare costs of household investment “mistakes” in Sweden,
focusing on under-diversiﬁcation of risky assets and nonparticipation in risky asset markets.
The ﬁnding that households who do participate are insuﬃciently diversiﬁed suggest that the
costs of nonparticipation are smaller than they would be otherwise. Thus, these authors
recognize that the expected beneﬁts of participation must be assessed based on some notion
of how households will actually behave once they choose to participate.
The work of Poterba et al. (2006) is also particularly relevant. Using simulations based on
5historical returns in the United States, they assess the outcomes of a number of investment
strategies, including (1) 100% investment in inﬂation indexed long-term bonds, corporate
stock, or long-term government bonds, (2) lifecycle funds, (3) the “No Lose” strategy pro-
posed by Feldstein (2005), and (4) simulated “optimal strategies.” They ﬁnd that the welfare
implications of the various strategies are very sensitive to assumptions on preferences, wealth
held outside of retirement plans, assets returns, and expense ratios. The role of expense ra-
tios is particularly relevant when one considers the beneﬁts of lifecycle funds, which tend to
carry higher ratios.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present theoretical models of portfolio
choice. We take a textbook model of dynamic decision making under uncertainty and then
adapt it to the case of retirement portfolio choice. With preferences exhibiting constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA), it has been shown that a household optimally holds a constant
share of risky assets. We show that if preferences instead exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA), then the share declines with age, as prescribed by advocates of lifecycle
investment strategies. Of course, households almost certainly have neither CARA nor CRRA
preferences, but it is worthwhile to learn how sensitive the optimal portfolio is to variation
in the speciﬁcation of preferences.
Section 3 describes the speciﬁcations for the simulations, the results of which are discussed
in Section 4. We ﬁnd that, over the lifetime, aggressive investing outperforms other lifestyle
strategies, as well as lifecycle investing and simple heuristics, when investors can tolerate
6variability of returns either because they have a low coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion or
they have considerable wealth held outside of the retirement account. Should investors use
simple rules of thumb to choose investments, then the impacts of these strategies on welfare
depend largely on the choice set. If larger choice sets cause them to undertake more risk,
then risk tolerant individuals tend to be made better oﬀ. If larger choice sets cause them
instead to reduce risks, then the increased choice set may make many worse oﬀ. In the latter
case, plan designs that induce lifecycle investing may be desired. Section 5 concludes.
2 Models of Portfolio Choice
2.1 Basic Model of Portfolio Choice
Following Blanchard & Fischer (1989, Chapter 6.2), we consider a consumer who lives until







where Φt denotes the period-t information set and future utility U(Ct+j) (j>0)i sd i s c o u n t e d
by β
j.
To begin, let the consumer be uncertain about future income Yt+j (j>0). The consumer
can allocate current period savings Yt − Ct , as well as accumulated assets At, between a
riskless asset yielding a known rate of return rt and a risky asset yielding an uncertain rate
7of return zt. Let the fraction ωt denote the share of the portfolio allocated to the riskless
asset. The budget constraint is given by
At+1 =( At + Yt − Ct)[(1+rt)ωt +( 1+zt)(1− ωt)]
At ≥ 0
The consumer chooses a consumption and portfolio plan at time 1, knowing that he
will be able to choose a new plan at time 2, and then again at time 3, and each period
thereafter. To solve for ﬁrst-period consumption C1 and portfolio share ω1,w em a yu s e
stochastic dynamic programming. We ﬁrst deﬁne the value function






subject to the budget constraint
The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation
Vt (At)= m a x
{Ct,ωt}
U(Ct)+βE [Vt+1 (At+1)|Φt]
With fully diversiﬁable income Yt, explicit solutions can be derived for the hyperbolic absolute
risk aversion class of utility functions, which include constant relative risk aversion, constant
absolute risk aversion, and quadratic utility functions. Under speciﬁcations of utility and
beliefs on income and returns, we can solve for the optimal consumption and portfolio plan
8via backward induction.
2.2 A Basic Model of Retirement Portfolio Choice
W en o wi n t r o d u c eas e c o n df o r mo fw e a l t ha c c u m u l a t i o ni nt h ef o r mo fr e t i r e m e n ta s s e t sMt.
Let mt denote the amount of the period-t contribution to retirement savings, to be allocated
between the riskless asset and the risky asset. Retirement assets accumulate according to
Mt+1 =( Mt + mt)[(1+rt)αt +( 1+zt)(1− αt)]
Mt ≥ 0
where αt is the period-t allocation of retirement assets to the riskless asset. To describe the
evolution of assets held outside of the retirement account, we may modify the earlier budget
constraint as follows
At+1 =( At + Yt − Ct − mt)[(1+rt)ωt +( 1+zt)(1− ωt)]
At ≥ 0
If there were no restrictions on retirement savings accounts and no tax beneﬁts, as is the case
here, then the consumer is indiﬀerent between putting a dollar into retirement savings or into
regular savings. Further, any tax beneﬁts yielding a higher eﬀective rate of return on return
retirement savings would cause the consumer to hold all wealth in the retirement account.
9The combination of restrictions on and tax-preferred treatment of retirement accounts yields
optimal portfolio choices that are more complicated. See, for example, Dammon, Spatt, and
Zhang (2004).
To simplify the problem, we begin by placing extreme restrictions on pre-retirement
income and savings. First, we assume that retirement is known with certainty to take place
in period τ <T.For all periods t<τ, the periodic contribution to retirement assets is ﬁxed
at mt = m.I np e r i o dτ, the consumer must dissolve the retirement account and purchase
an annuity, a requirement that has been included among proposals for private investment of
Social Security. Therefore, no further contributions are made; that is, mt =0for all t ≥ τ.
Further, we will assume that the only form of retirement income is the annuity income Y A
t ,
which is assumed to be ﬁxed across time and is determine solely by the period-τ level of
retirement assets Mτ according to an annuity income function Y A
t (Mτ).






t (Mτ) − Ct
´
[(1 + rt)ωt +( 1+zt)(1− ωt)]
At ≥ 0
10As before, we may write the Bellman equation as
Vt (At)= m a x
{Ct,ωt}
U(Ct)+βE [Vt+1 (At+1)|Φt] for any t ≥ τ
because, at time τ, the future evolution of retirement assets is fully determined.
In any period t<τ, t h ec o n s u m e rm u s tc h o o s eCt,ωt, and αt to maximize expected
utility, subject to the constraints
Mt+1 =( Mt + m)[(1+rt)αt +( 1+zt)(1− αt)]
Mt ≥ 0
and
At+1 =( At + Yt − Ct − m)[(1+rt)ωt +( 1+zt)(1− ωt)]
At ≥ 0
The Bellman equation may be written as
Vt (At,M t)= m a x
{Ct,ωt,αt}
U(Ct)+βE [Vt+1 (At+1,M t+1)|Φt] for any t<τ
11Note that we now have two state variables, At and Mt, until t = τ. In period τ, the depen-
dence of the value function on Mt ends because the consumer must dissolve the retirement
holdings. We may therefore write Vt(At) in place of Vt(At,M t) for all t ≥ τ. Before simpli-
fying the model further, we note that the existence of both retirement and non-retirement
portfolios complicates any analysis of retirement portfolios alone. We now abstract from
these concerns to focus on the central issue of retirement portfolio management.
Suppose that wealth can only be accumulated in the form of retirement assets, as modelled
above. Thus, we now have just one state variable Mt, which evolves according to
Mt+1 =( Mt + m)[(1+rt)αt +( 1+zt)(1− αt)]
Mt ≥ 0
for all t<τ. In period τ, the consumer must dissolve the retirement account and purchase
an annuity. Income from this annuity Y A




t ) for all t ≥ τ
and we assume assume Y A
t (Mτ)= Mτ
T−τ ∀t ≥ τ. Prior to retirement, all income is spent on
consumption, but for the ﬁxed contribution to the retirement account; therefore,
U(Ct)=U(Yt − m) for all t<τ
12Thus, the only choice variable is the retirement asset portfolio share αt..
Suppose utility reﬂects CARA preferences:
U(c)=1− e
−γc
where γ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Furthermore, assume that rate of
return on the risky asset is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2.






σ2γ (m + Mτ−j)
Qj−1
n=1 (rτ−n +1 )
As long as the expected returns to the risky asset exceed the riskless rate, αt tends to
increase in (a) the degree of risk aversion and (b) the riskiness of the risky asset. Further,
the optimal portfolio share αt will tend to increase over time as retirement approaches, as is
the case with lifecycle funds.
133 Simulation Speciﬁcations
3.1 Retirement Savings Contributions
We develop a tractable approach to the simulations by considering only the contributions
to the retirement savings account. Mirroring the approach taken in Poterba et al. (2006),
we make our welfare calculations of utility of total wealth held at retirement in period τ
by combining the two forms of wealth. Our simulations will include a range of values for
non-retirement wealth holdings to assess the sensitivity of the results to assumptions on
these holdings. Poterba et al. ﬁnd that the welfare implications of alternative investment
strategies are very sensitive to these assumptions.
To simulate retirement account contributions, we consider three types of households with
one worker whose earnings proﬁle is based on level of education—less than high school, some
college, and college degree—simulated based on previous empirical ﬁndings (Heckman et al.,
2003; and Hubbard et al., 1995). In particular, we use point estimates in Heckman et al.
(2003) to determine mean log earnings as follows:
6.8912 + (.1292E)+( .1301X) − (.0023X
2))
where E is years of schooling (11 for less than high school, 14 for those with some college
and 16 for college graduates) and X is years of experience and calculated as (age +1 8− E).
Log earnings are assumed to follow an AR(1) process with autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρ and a
14mean zero innovation that is normally distributed with standard deviation σ. From Hubbard
et al. (1995), we specify:
education level σπ
less than high school 0.033 0.955
some college 0.025 0.946
college 0.016 0.955
We consider households who contribute 9 percent of pretax earnings to the retirement
account, as in the Poterba et al. simulations, as well as households who contribute only 5
percent.
Following Porterba et al. (2006), we assume that households have preferences that exhibit
CRRA. We consider three levels of risk aversion: mild risk aversion (γ =1 .1), moderate risk
aversion (γ =2 ), and strong risk aversion (γ =5 )
3.2 Investment Choice Sets
We begin with a baseline set of 3 funds: F1 composed solely of Treasury bills, F2 composed
solely of long-term government bonds, and F3 composed solely of common stock. We also
simulate the eﬀects of adding consider two additional equity funds, F4 and F5, just as the
TSP added a small-cap (S) fund and an international (I) fund in 2001 to the three previously
available funds—the short-term nonmarketable Treasury securities (G) fund, the bond index
(F) fund, and the equity index (C) fund.
15We also simulate the eﬀects of adding funds that are created by blending the other funds.
We add a lifecycle fund (LF), just as the TSP added a lifecycle (L) fund in 2005. We also
add three lifestyle funds—B1 (conservative), B2 (moderate), and B3 (aggressive). Thus, the
largest choice set includes nine funds, but four of these are linear combinations of the other
ﬁve.
The conservative lifestyle fund holds 40 percent in Treasury bills and 15 percent each
in funds F2-F5. The moderate lifestyle fund allocates equally across all ﬁve funds. The
aggressive lifestyle fund holds no treasury bills and 25 percent each in F2-F5. In each case,
the ratio of stocks to bonds is 3-to-1, equal to the Canner et al. (1997) calculation of the
optimal ratio based on historical returns from 1926 to 1992 which also form the foundation
for our speciﬁcation of stochastic returns as describe below. The selected allocations to
T-bills are calibrated based on holdings in lifestyle funds reported by Canner et al.
The lifecycle fund is implemented in line with the simple heuristic cited by Canner et al.
The proportion in F1 is linearly increasing in age while maintaining ﬁxed ratios among F2 -
F5. In particular, the initial allocation for the lifecycle fund places nothing in Treasury bills
and 25 percent each in the remaining funds. Each subsequent year, one percent from each
of the funds, F2-F5 is shifted to Treasury bills. Therefore, the lifecycle fund initially mimics
the aggressive lifestyle fund. At 45 years of age, the lifecycle fund mimics the moderate
lifestyle fund and at 65 years of age the lifecycle fund mimics the conservative lifestyle fund.
As such, the fund maintains a 3-to-1 ratio of stocks to bonds
163.3 Stochastic Returns
Canner et al. (1997) report descriptive statistics for the historical distribution of annual real
returns from 1926-1992 for Treasury Bills, long-term government bonds, and common stock,
which we use to determine the stochastic returns to F1, F2, and F3. We add two stylized
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19We generate the returns to the three baseline line funds (F1, F2, and, F3) from a multi-
variate normal distribution of returns characterized by the above means, standard deviations,
and correlations. The additional stock funds (F4 and F5) are generated with higher means
and variances than the common stock fund, exhibiting strong positive correlation with each
other and with the common stock fund F3. Together, the joint distribution of the returns
to the ﬁve funds are multivariate normal.
3.4 Investment Strategies
We consider three types of strategies—lifecycle investing, lifestyle investing, and simple heuris-
tics. The lifecycle strategy mirrors the lifecycle fund in the investment choice set.
We label as lifestyle strategies an approach that follows from the ﬁndings on optimal
portfolio choice by Samuelson (1969) and others and simply keeps a ﬁxed portfolio allocation
across periods until retirement. Note that withC R R Ap r e f e r e n c e sa n dn o r m a l l yd i s t r i b u t e d
returns, this approach should be optimal. However, rather than letting each individual choose
the optimal allocation given preferences, we simulate only three allocations, mirroring the
conservative, medium, and growth funds in the choice set. Thus, the behavior of an individual
choosing, for example, the conservative lifestyle strategy is invariant to the expansion of the
choice set from ﬁve to nine funds. When the choice set consists just of three funds—F1,
F2, and F3—each lifestyle strategy allocation to F1 and F2 remains unchanged, whereas the
allocation to F3 is tripled, thereby maintaining the 3-to-1 ratio of stocks to bonds.
20Finally, we simulate two strategies based the heuristics identiﬁed in the behavioral ﬁnance
literature. The 1
n decision rule is very simple to implement for retirement contributions.
Clearly, this strategy is sensitive to every change in choice set. We also consider a “sure
bet” decision rule based on the ﬁndings of Iyengar and Jiang (2005), whereby an expansion
of the choice set leads to an increased allocation to the safest fund, F1. With the three
baseline funds, we use the 1
n rule. Then, as the choice set expands, an increasing fraction is
allocated to the F1 fund and the remainder is allocated equally across the other funds, as
in Huberman and Jiang (2006). In particular, when the choice set includes ﬁve funds, the
“sure bet” decision rule allocates 40 percent to T-bills and 15 percent each to the remaining
funds. Note that this allocation is identical to the conservative lifestyle fund, B1. When the
choice set includes nine funds, the “sure bet” decision rule allocates 60 percent to treasury
bills and 5 percent each to the remaining funds.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Wealth Accumulation
Figure 1A describes the simulation results for an individual with 11 years of education (i.e.,
less than high school diploma) who contributes 5% of earnings to a retirement account for
40 years, starting at age 25. For each investment strategy and choice set, we perform 10,000
simulations of total retirement wealth accumulation. The boxes in Figure 1A depict the
21central tendency of the distribution of simulated wealth accumulation, where the top of the
box is the mean and the bottom of the box is the median. The mean always exceeds the
median because the distribution of cumulative returns is positively skewed, whereas yearly
returns are symmetric. The vertical lines depict the range between the 0.05-quantile and the
0.95-quantile of accumulated wealth.
Figures 1B and 1C describe the distributions of outcomes for an individual with (1B)
11 years of education and a 9% contribution rate and (1C) 16 years of education and a 5%
contribution rate. Inspection of these ﬁgures reveal that the variation in education levels
and contribution rates basically leads to re-scaling of the vertical axes (i.e., the magnitude of
wealth accumulation). That is, the greater the education or contribution rate, the larger is
the accumulation. We may therefore restrict attention to the ﬁrst set of simulations described
in Figure 1A to understand the impact of investment strategies and choice sets on retirement
wealth accumulation.
Consider ﬁrst the outcomes with just three investment choices — Treasury bills (F1),
long-term government bonds (F2), and common stock (F3). The outcomes for the other
strategies can be interpreted relative to the outcomes for the conservative, moderate, and
aggressive strategies, each of which maintain a three-to-one ratio of stock to bonds, with
the speciﬁc allocations determined by the share in T-bills. Not surprisingly, allocating less
to T-bills (i.e., more aggressive investing) yields a greater central tendency and spread of
the wealth distribution. More importantly, the greater expected returns are not associated
22with much, if any, increase in the probability of a low level of wealth accumulation. The
0.05-quantile is around $50,000 for each strategy, and is actually highest for the aggressive
strategy.
By construction, the 1
n-rule and the sure bet strategy yield identical outcomes with just
three funds in the choice set. These strategies are very conservative, yielding lower wealth
accumulation than the conservative strategy. Moreover, with a one-to-one ratio of stocks to
bonds, these strategies basically miss out on the upper end up the distribution of returns
to the conservative strategy without cutting oﬀ the lower end. Thus, the (.05-trimmed-)
conservative distribution stochastically dominates the (0.05-trimmed-) distribution arising
from the 1
n and sure bet strategies.
Recall that the lifecycle strategy begins with an allocation equal to that of the aggressive
strategy, but reduces the allocation to risky assets until it equals the moderate allocation at
age 45 and would mirror the conservative allocation at age 65. We see that the accumulated
wealth distribution looks more like a mix of conservative and moderate strategies alone. This
outcome arises because aggressive investing occurs early on in the lifecycle, when wealth
accumulation is relatively low, and conservative investing occurs later on when accumulated
wealth is relatively large. Thus, this strategy is, eﬀectively, a weighted average of the three
lifestyle funds where the weights are determined by accumulated wealth. While conservative,
this strategy seems to outperform the 1
n and sure bet strategies.
Now consider the outcomes with 5 choices—F1 to F5. The wealth distributions improve
23somewhat, in the sense of stochastic dominance, for each of the lifestyle strategies. This
change arises mostly from the additional diversiﬁcation, as the ratio of stocks to bonds and
the allocation to T-bills is unchanged from the case of three choices.
We also see a substantial divergence in outcomes between the 1
n and the sure bet strate-
gies. The addition of two equity funds causes the 1
n investor to allocate a greater share of
total wealth to equities and reduce the allocation to either T-bills or bonds. In fact, this
strategy now adopts the moderate investment strategy and, therefore, the 3-to-1 ratio of
stocks to bonds. The sure bet investor also uses the three-to-one ratio but increases the
allocation to T-bills. Therefore, the 1
n strategy outperforms the sure bet strategy when
faced with these ﬁve choices. Once again, the lifecycle investment strategy yields something
in between conservative and moderate investing. As speciﬁed, it therefore generates higher
expected returns than the sure bet strategy but not the 1
n rule.
Finally, consider the addition of four funds to yield nine choices. The performance of the
three lifestyle strategies and the lifecycle strategy are unchanged, because they are simply
mixes of the ﬁve other funds. The performance of the 1
n strategy is basically unchanged
from the case of ﬁve choices, because mixing in the additional four funds does not have
much eﬀect on the resulting allocation to the original ﬁve funds. The central tendency of the
accumulation based on the sure bet strategy falls markedly, however. This outcome arises
from the increased allocation to T-bills, which also yields a substantial decrease in the spread
of the distribution.
244.2 Certainty Equivalent Wealth Accumulation
We evaluate the welfare implications of alternative investment strategies and choice sets by
comparing certainty equivalent wealth (CEW) accumulations under CRRA preferences. We
c o n s i d e rt h r e ev a l u e sf o rt h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion—γ= 1 . 1 ,2 ,o r5 — a n df o rt h e
amount of wealth held at age 65 outside of the retirement account—$0; $100,000; or $250,000.
The results are presented in Table 1A and Table 1B. Figure 2A depicts the results for an
individual with 11 years of education, a 5% contribution rate, and no wealth held outside
of the retirement account. Figure 2B changes the outside wealth to $100,000. These two
ﬁgures capture much of the qualitative pattern of results described in Tables 1A and 1B for
all the strategies, choice sets, education levels, and contribution rates.
With the greatest tolerance for risk (γ =1 .1), the pattern of variation in certainty
equivalent wealth most closely resembles that for mean wealth presented in Figures 1A, 1B,
and 1C. Table 1B presents the ﬁndings for CEW for any strategy and choice set expressed
as a fraction of the CEW under aggressive investment for the same choice set. With γ =1.1
or 2.0 and outside wealth of $0 or $100,000, the ratio always falls short of 0.90. With outside
wealth of $250,000, the ratio sometimes exceeds 0.90 with γ =2 .0 and $250,000 in outside
wealth and the moderate investment strategy, the 1
n rule, or lifecycle investing.
The most striking changes occur with no outside wealth and substantial risk aversion;
that is, γ =5 .0. Only in this case does moderate or conservative investing tend to outperform
aggressive investing in terms of CEW. In fact, with just three assets in the choice set, the
25lifecycle strategy outperforms all others in these cases. With ﬁve or nine choices, the 1
n
rule and lifecycle investing perform similarly, whereas the sure bet strategy lags far behind,
especially when nine funds are available.
One main lesson seems to be that aggressive investing outperforms the other strategies
when investors can tolerate variability of returns either because they have a low coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion or they have considerable wealth held outside of the retirement account.
Should investors use simple rules of thumb to choose investments, then the impact of these
strategies on welfare depend to a large extent on the choice set they are oﬀered. If larger
choice sets cause them to undertake more risk (e.g., 1
n rule and addition of equity funds),
then risk tolerant individuals (e.g. low γ a n dh i g ho u t s i d ew e a l t h )w i l lb em a d eb e t t e ro ﬀ.
If larger choice sets cause them to reduce risk (e.g., sure bet strategy), then the increased
choice set may make many worse oﬀ. In the latter case, plan designs that induce lifecycle
investing may be desired.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Throughout their working lives, individuals must choose how to allocate income between
consumption and savings and how to allocate savings among numerous possible asset hold-
ings, including those in dedicated retirement accounts. The evolution of these assets prior to
and throughout the retirement years is an important determinant of ﬁnancial security and
well-being in old age. Yet individuals appear to make savings and investment decisions that
26are not easy to explain by conventional economic models. The growth of deﬁned-contribution
pension plans over the past two decades has increased the sensitivity of retirement security
to variation in the returns to selected investments. Proposals for private accounts to replace
or supplement Social Security beneﬁts would strengthen this trend. This heightened sensi-
tivity to ﬁnancial market outcomes, together with ﬁndings that individuals tend to exhibit
“behavioral anomalies” when it comes to ﬁnancial decisions and to be poorly informed about
their pension and Social Security beneﬁts, raises concerns that an increasingly large portion
of the population will reach normal or desired retirement age without adequate resources.
To address concerns about choices made in personal retirement accounts, President Bush’s
reform proposal called for automatic enrollment in a lifecycle fund at age-47, subject to
an opt-out provision. But would investment in a single lifecycle fund be better for all
such households, who must have heterogeneous preferences and wealth? If so, then, in the
context of a personal retirement account component of Social Security, why not just have an
independent agency invest the funds for everyone, perhaps with an opt-out provision?
The ﬁnal report of the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001)
oﬀers the following argument against such a policy: “Personal accounts allow every investor
to choose an investment portfolio that is consistent with his or her preferences, while central
government investment essentially forces everyone into a ‘one size ﬁts all’ portfolio” (page
38). Yet, given the apparent impact of default rules, is this not what the White House plan
proposes to do?
27A full assessment of the merits of arguments about this issue require a better understand-
ing of the welfare implications of deviations from optimal behavior. That is the goal of our
simulations. We ﬁnd a lifecycle investment strategy to be relatively conservative when taken
from a lifetime perspective. That is, the most aggressive investing takes place early in life
when retirement assets are relatively small, whereas investing gets progressively conservative
as assets build. This strategy contradicts well known prescriptions from ﬁnancial theory. We
also ﬁnd that this strategy may be outperformed by a simple 1
n rule. In contrast, while it
does tend to be conservative, lifecycle investing may induce some investors to take on more
risk than they would otherwise and to invest more eﬃciently than when left to their naive
strategies.
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32Strategy Choices γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0
1/n 3 84.4 79.3 65.0 152.1 142.8 116.3 187.8 185.4 178.4 256.8 251.0 235.1 339.2 337.7 333.4 409.4 405.6 394.6
1/n 5 141.1 123.9 81.5 251.1 221.8 149.5 250.4 240.0 214.5 362.1 341.0 290.5 405.5 398.3 379.7 520.1 504.2 464.9
1/n 9 140.2 123.4 81.8 249.5 220.8 150.0 249.2 239.1 214.2 360.2 339.7 290.2 404.2 397.2 379.1 518.0 502.6 464.2
Sure Bet 3 84.4 79.3 65.0 152.1 142.8 116.3 187.8 185.4 178.4 256.8 251.0 235.1 339.2 337.7 333.4 409.4 405.6 394.6
Sure Bet 5 106.2 98.3 76.4 189.4 176.0 138.8 211.0 206.8 195.2 295.3 286.4 262.3 363.2 360.6 353.0 449.1 442.9 425.6
Sure Bet 9 74.3 71.8 63.8 133.1 128.7 115.2 176.1 175.0 171.6 235.4 232.9 225.2 326.8 326.2 324.2 386.6 385.0 380.1
Conservative 3 96.9 89.2 68.4 174.8 160.6 122.4 201.8 197.8 187.1 281.3 272.2 248.0 354.0 351.5 344.4 435.4 429.0 411.6
Conservative 5 or 9 106.2 98.3 76.4 189.4 176.0 138.8 211.0 206.8 195.2 295.3 286.4 262.3 363.2 360.6 353.0 449.1 442.9 425.6
Moderate 3 123.7 107.5 68.5 223.6 193.6 122.7 233.3 223.7 201.0 335.9 314.9 266.7 388.2 381.6 365.0 494.4 478.6 440.8
Moderate 5 or 9 141.1 123.9 81.5 251.1 221.8 149.5 250.4 240.0 214.5 362.1 341.0 290.5 405.5 398.3 379.7 520.1 504.2 464.9
Aggressive 3 155.5 124.8 62.7 281.5 225.0 112.6 271.8 251.9 211.8 402.0 360.0 278.6 431.4 416.5 384.1 567.5 534.0 465.0
Aggressive 5 or 9 185.5 151.6 80.4 329.3 271.6 149.9 301.4 278.8 231.4 447.7 403.8 312.8 461.5 444.6 406.5 612.5 577.3 501.7
Life Cycle 3 117.4 104.1 72.0 211.7 187.4 128.9 225.3 217.6 198.8 321.9 305.0 265.0 379.3 374.1 360.7 478.9 466.4 435.5
Life Cycle 5 or 9 132.5 118.5 83.3 236.1 212.3 152.3 240.3 231.9 211.0 345.3 328.4 286.6 394.4 388.8 373.8 502.0 489.4 457.3
Strategy Choices γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0
1/n 3 116.0 109.6 90.9 209.3 197.8 164.7 219.6 216.1 206.1 314.0 306.1 284.1 371.4 369.2 362.7 467.2 461.7 445.8
1/n 5 189.2 168.3 116.4 339.6 302.7 212.3 298.5 284.6 250.6 450.6 422.2 353.6 454.6 444.6 418.9 609.8 587.5 532.4
1/n 9 187.9 167.5 116.8 337.2 301.3 212.8 297.0 283.5 250.2 448.0 420.3 353.3 452.9 443.2 418.2 607.0 585.3 531.5
Sure Bet 3 116.0 109.6 90.9 209.3 197.8 164.7 219.6 216.1 206.1 314.0 306.1 284.1 371.4 369.2 362.7 467.2 461.7 445.8
Sure Bet 5 144.3 134.8 108.0 259.4 242.5 196.1 249.2 243.5 227.6 365.3 353.1 319.7 402.0 398.2 387.3 519.9 510.8 485.7
Sure Bet 9 103.1 100.0 90.4 185.5 179.9 163.2 204.9 203.4 198.5 287.9 284.3 273.3 355.8 354.8 351.9 439.4 437.0 429.5
Conservative 3 132.0 122.5 95.2 238.5 221.0 173.7 237.2 231.7 216.4 345.1 332.6 299.6 390.0 386.3 375.9 499.8 490.8 466.0
Conservative 5 or 9 144.3 134.8 108.0 259.4 242.5 196.1 249.2 243.5 227.6 365.3 353.1 319.7 402.0 398.2 387.3 519.9 510.8 485.7
Moderate 3 166.4 146.2 93.8 301.1 264.2 177.5 276.3 263.3 232.2 413.3 385.5 320.8 432.2 423.0 399.7 573.0 551.4 499.4
Moderate 5 or 9 189.2 168.3 116.4 339.6 302.7 212.3 298.5 284.6 250.6 450.6 422.2 353.6 454.6 444.6 418.9 609.8 587.5 532.4
Aggressive 3 206.7 168.8 82.8 374.9 305.6 169.3 323.5 297.3 243.5 495.3 440.6 333.0 484.6 464.6 420.7 662.5 617.8 525.4
Aggressive 5 or 9 245.7 204.8 117.5 440.5 368.3 214.9 361.7 332.2 270.0 558.9 500.7 379.2 523.3 500.5 449.6 725.5 677.5 574.2
Life Cycle 3 157.5 141.4 99.7 284.8 255.3 183.8 265.6 255.3 230.0 394.9 372.7 319.5 420.4 413.2 394.6 552.8 535.8 493.5
Life Cycle 5 or 9 177.3 160.7 118.3 318.3 288.8 214.8 285.0 274.1 246.5 427.5 404.9 348.9 439.9 432.2 411.8 585.1 567.6 523.0
Strategy Choices γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0
1/n 3 142.8 135.6 114.5 256.4 243.5 206.2 246.6 242.2 229.8 360.9 351.6 325.2 398.6 395.8 387.4 514.3 507.6 488.1
1/n 5 226.0 202.9 142.6 409.2 367.6 264.7 335.1 319.0 279.0 520.0 486.6 405.5 491.6 479.6 449.2 679.7 652.9 586.4
1/n 9 224.4 201.9 143.1 406.3 365.8 265.2 333.3 317.6 278.6 516.8 484.3 405.1 489.6 478.0 448.3 676.3 650.2 585.4
Sure Bet 3 142.8 135.6 114.5 256.4 243.5 206.2 246.6 242.2 229.8 360.9 351.6 325.2 398.6 395.8 387.4 514.3 507.6 488.1
Sure Bet 5 174.3 163.8 133.4 315.4 296.3 243.2 279.2 272.4 253.5 421.2 406.7 366.8 432.2 427.5 414.2 576.1 565.0 534.2
Sure Bet 9 126.4 122.9 112.2 228.3 222.1 202.8 228.3 226.3 220.3 330.7 326.3 313.0 379.2 378.0 374.2 482.4 479.3 469.9
Conservative 3 162.1 151.0 120.6 290.6 271.0 217.0 267.4 260.4 241.4 396.9 382.4 342.8 420.6 415.8 402.5 552.0 541.1 510.9
Conservative 5 or 9 174.3 163.8 133.4 315.4 296.3 243.2 279.2 272.4 253.5 421.2 406.7 366.8 432.2 427.5 414.2 576.1 565.0 534.2
Moderate 3 202.9 179.4 122.9 363.6 322.0 221.7 313.0 296.9 258.7 475.5 443.0 365.8 469.8 458.0 428.6 635.6 609.9 547.1
Moderate 5 or 9 226.0 202.9 142.6 409.2 367.6 264.7 335.1 319.0 279.0 520.0 486.6 405.5 491.6 479.6 449.2 679.7 652.9 586.4
Aggressive 3 250.6 206.7 116.3 449.2 371.0 211.2 367.8 335.6 270.3 569.0 505.6 377.6 530.3 505.1 450.9 736.9 684.3 574.2
Aggressive 5 or 9 290.6 245.5 141.0 526.8 445.5 270.5 406.1 372.4 300.1 644.8 577.0 434.4 568.2 541.7 482.5 811.9 755.1 632.1
Life Cycle 3 191.6 173.2 127.5 343.1 310.5 229.5 299.8 287.3 256.4 452.7 427.4 365.0 455.2 446.2 422.9 610.9 591.0 540.8
Life Cycle 5 or 9 211.4 193.2 145.3 382.7 349.8 266.3 318.9 306.3 274.3 491.6 465.4 399.7 474.1 464.9 440.9 649.4 628.6 575.4
Expressed in $1000s
$0 in Outside Wealth
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
11 Years of Education
$250K in Outside Wealth
$100K in Outside Wealth
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
$250K in Outside Wealth
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
9% Contribution Rate 5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate 5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
16 Years of Education
$0 in Outside Wealth $100K in Outside Wealth
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
Table 1: Simulations of Certainty Equivalent Wealth Accumulation
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
14 Years of Education
$0 in Outside Wealth $100K in Outside Wealth $250K in Outside Wealth
5% Contribution RateStrategy Choices γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0
1/n 3 0.54 0.64 1.04 0.54 0.63 1.03 0.69 0.74 0.84 0.64 0.70 0.84 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.72 0.76 0.85
1/n 5 0.76 0.82 1.01 0.76 0.82 1.00 0.83 0.86 0.93 0.81 0.84 0.93 0.88 0.90 0.93 0.85 0.87 0.93
1/n 9 0.76 0.81 1.02 0.76 0.81 1.00 0.83 0.86 0.93 0.80 0.84 0.93 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.85 0.87 0.93
Sure Bet 3 0.54 0.64 1.04 0.54 0.63 1.03 0.69 0.74 0.84 0.64 0.70 0.84 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.72 0.76 0.85
Sure Bet 5 0.57 0.65 0.95 0.58 0.65 0.93 0.70 0.74 0.84 0.66 0.71 0.84 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.73 0.77 0.85
Sure Bet 9 0.40 0.47 0.79 0.40 0.47 0.77 0.58 0.63 0.74 0.53 0.58 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.80 0.63 0.67 0.76
Conservative 3 0.62 0.71 1.09 0.62 0.71 1.09 0.74 0.79 0.88 0.70 0.76 0.89 0.82 0.84 0.90 0.77 0.80 0.89
Conservative 5 or 9 0.57 0.65 0.95 0.58 0.65 0.93 0.70 0.74 0.84 0.66 0.71 0.84 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.73 0.77 0.85
Moderate 3 0.80 0.86 1.09 0.79 0.86 1.09 0.86 0.89 0.95 0.84 0.87 0.96 0.90 0.92 0.95 0.87 0.90 0.95
Moderate 5 or 9 0.76 0.82 1.01 0.76 0.82 1.00 0.83 0.86 0.93 0.81 0.84 0.93 0.88 0.90 0.93 0.85 0.87 0.93
Aggressive 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Aggressive 5 or 9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Life Cycle 3 0.75 0.83 1.15 0.75 0.83 1.14 0.83 0.86 0.94 0.80 0.85 0.95 0.88 0.90 0.94 0.84 0.87 0.94
Life Cycle 5 or 9 0.71 0.78 1.04 0.72 0.78 1.02 0.80 0.83 0.91 0.77 0.81 0.92 0.85 0.87 0.92 0.82 0.85 0.91
Strategy Choices γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0
1/n 3 0.56 0.65 1.10 0.56 0.65 0.97 0.68 0.73 0.85 0.63 0.69 0.85 0.77 0.79 0.86 0.71 0.75 0.85
1/n 5 0.77 0.82 0.99 0.77 0.82 0.99 0.83 0.86 0.93 0.81 0.84 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.84 0.87 0.93
1/n 9 0.76 0.82 0.99 0.77 0.82 0.99 0.82 0.85 0.93 0.80 0.84 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.84 0.86 0.93
Sure Bet 3 0.56 0.65 1.10 0.56 0.65 0.97 0.68 0.73 0.85 0.63 0.69 0.85 0.77 0.79 0.86 0.71 0.75 0.85
Sure Bet 5 0.59 0.66 0.92 0.59 0.66 0.91 0.69 0.73 0.84 0.65 0.71 0.84 0.77 0.80 0.86 0.72 0.75 0.85
Sure Bet 9 0.42 0.49 0.77 0.42 0.49 0.76 0.57 0.61 0.74 0.52 0.57 0.72 0.68 0.71 0.78 0.61 0.65 0.75
Conservative 3 0.64 0.73 1.15 0.64 0.72 1.03 0.73 0.78 0.89 0.70 0.75 0.90 0.80 0.83 0.89 0.75 0.79 0.89
Conservative 5 or 9 0.59 0.66 0.92 0.59 0.66 0.91 0.69 0.73 0.84 0.65 0.71 0.84 0.77 0.80 0.86 0.72 0.75 0.85
Moderate 3 0.80 0.87 1.13 0.80 0.86 1.05 0.85 0.89 0.95 0.83 0.87 0.96 0.89 0.91 0.95 0.86 0.89 0.95
Moderate 5 or 9 0.77 0.82 0.99 0.77 0.82 0.99 0.83 0.86 0.93 0.81 0.84 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.84 0.87 0.93
Aggressive 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Aggressive 5 or 9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Life Cycle 3 0.76 0.84 1.20 0.76 0.84 1.09 0.82 0.86 0.94 0.80 0.85 0.96 0.87 0.89 0.94 0.83 0.87 0.94
Life Cycle 5 or 9 0.72 0.78 1.01 0.72 0.78 1.00 0.79 0.82 0.91 0.76 0.81 0.92 0.84 0.86 0.92 0.81 0.84 0.91
Strategy Choices γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0 γ=1.1 γ=2.0 γ=5.0
1/n 3 0.57 0.66 0.98 0.57 0.66 0.98 0.67 0.72 0.85 0.63 0.70 0.86 0.75 0.78 0.86 0.70 0.74 0.85
1/n 5 0.78 0.83 1.01 0.78 0.83 0.98 0.83 0.86 0.93 0.81 0.84 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.84 0.86 0.93
1/n 9 0.77 0.82 1.02 0.77 0.82 0.98 0.82 0.85 0.93 0.80 0.84 0.93 0.86 0.88 0.93 0.83 0.86 0.93
Sure Bet 3 0.57 0.66 0.98 0.57 0.66 0.98 0.67 0.72 0.85 0.63 0.70 0.86 0.75 0.78 0.86 0.70 0.74 0.85
Sure Bet 5 0.60 0.67 0.95 0.60 0.66 0.90 0.69 0.73 0.84 0.65 0.70 0.84 0.76 0.79 0.86 0.71 0.75 0.85
Sure Bet 9 0.43 0.50 0.80 0.43 0.50 0.75 0.56 0.61 0.73 0.51 0.57 0.72 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.59 0.63 0.74
Conservative 3 0.65 0.73 1.04 0.65 0.73 1.03 0.73 0.78 0.89 0.70 0.76 0.91 0.79 0.82 0.89 0.75 0.79 0.89
Conservative 5 or 9 0.60 0.67 0.95 0.60 0.66 0.90 0.69 0.73 0.84 0.65 0.70 0.84 0.76 0.79 0.86 0.71 0.75 0.85
Moderate 3 0.81 0.87 1.06 0.81 0.87 1.05 0.85 0.88 0.96 0.84 0.88 0.97 0.89 0.91 0.95 0.86 0.89 0.95
Moderate 5 or 9 0.78 0.83 1.01 0.78 0.83 0.98 0.83 0.86 0.93 0.81 0.84 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.84 0.86 0.93
Aggressive 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Aggressive 5 or 9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Life Cycle 3 0.76 0.84 1.10 0.76 0.84 1.09 0.82 0.86 0.95 0.80 0.85 0.97 0.86 0.88 0.94 0.83 0.86 0.94
Life Cycle 5 or 9 0.73 0.79 1.03 0.73 0.79 0.98 0.79 0.82 0.91 0.76 0.81 0.92 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.80 0.83 0.91
Table 1B: Simulations of Certainty Equivalent Wealth Accumulation
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
14 Years of Education
$0 in Outside Wealth $100K in Outside Wealth $250K in Outside Wealth
5% Contribution Rate
Expressed as a Fraction of Certainty Equivalent Wealth Under Aggressive Investment Strategy
9% Contribution Rate 5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate 5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
16 Years of Education
$0 in Outside Wealth $100K in Outside Wealth $250K in Outside Wealth
$100K in Outside Wealth
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
$250K in Outside Wealth
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
$0 in Outside Wealth
5% Contribution Rate 9% Contribution Rate
11 Years of EducationFigure 1A: Simulations of Retirement Wealth Accumulation:
11 years of Education, Contribution Rate of 5%
Endpoints of vertical line depict 0.05- and 0.95-quantiles of retirement wealth
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1/n Rule Sure Bet Conservative Moderate Aggressive Life CycleFigure 1B: Simulations of Retirement Wealth Accumulation:
11 years of Education, Contribution Rate of 9%
Endpoints of vertical line depict 0.05- and 0.95-quantiles of retirement wealth
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1/n Rule Sure Bet Conservative Moderate Aggressive Life CycleFigure 1C: Simulations of Retirement Wealth Accumulation:
16 years of Education, Contribution Rate of 5%
Endpoints of vertical line depict 0.05- and 0.95-quantiles of retirement wealth
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1/n Rule Sure Bet Conservative Moderate Aggressive Life CycleFigure 2A: Simulations of Certainty Equivalent Wealth Accumulation
11 years of Education, 5% Contribution Rate, $0 Outside Wealth
Endpoints of vertical line depict certainty equivalent wealth for γ=1.1 (top) and γ=5 (bottom)








3 5 9 3 5 9 3 5 or 9 3 5 or 9 3 5 or 9 3 5 or 9




























1/n Rule Sure Bet Conservative Moderate Aggressive Life CycleFigure 2B: Simulations of Certainty Equivalent Wealth Accumulation
11 years of Education, 5% Contribution Rate, $100k Outside Wealth
Endpoints of vertical line depict certainty equivalent wealth for γ=1.1 (top) and γ=5 (bottom)
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1/n Rule Sure Bet Conservative Moderate Aggressive Life Cycle